Kenya's China Policy

Kenya didn’t attend China’s 2025 Victory Day. Instead, it co-hosted a symposium in Nairobi with the Chinese embassy.

That decision was part of a long-standing strategy of non-alignment in its foreign policy. By declining to attend China’s parade, Nairobi reaffirmed a tradition of hedging that preserves flexibility between Washington and Beijing.

By not going to Beijing, Kenya missed a masterclass in military theatre that included intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking anywhere in the continental United States. These mobile nuclear platforms suggest both reach and survivability, as well as hypersonic delivery systems that American planners quietly admit they cannot yet fully match.

Every missile that glistened under the Beijing sun carried a silent subtext: China is not only a rising power but a rising nuclear power, and its arsenal is both modern and mobile.

At the center stood Xi Jinping with Vladimir Putin on one side and Kim Jong Un on the other. The symbolism was not subtle. Between them, they represent the world’s most conspicuous nuclear arsenals outside of Washington. Actually, Russia and China together command the largest nuclear stockpiles on earth.

Who Showed Up, Who Didn’t, and Why

More than twenty foreign leaders attended.

Kim Jong Un, usually mocked for his theatrical missile parades, now stood in Beijing vindicated, his nuclear ambitions granted a veneer of legitimacy by the company he kept.

Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian was also there, another reminder that Beijing’s embrace extends to states that defy American sanctions and pursue their own strategic deterrents.

Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, Kazakhstan’s Kassym Jomart Tokayev, Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim, Vietnam’s President Lương Cường, Zimbabwe’s Emmerson Mnangagwa, Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, and Congo’s Denis Sassou Nguesso joined the roster.

South Korea, despite its deep security alliance with Washington, joined North Korea in Beijing, sending the Speaker of its National Assembly. This was not a trivial act; South Korea is a loyal ally of the United States, but could not afford to miss Beijing’s big day.

Absence also spoke loudly.

The United States avoided the spectacle entirely, unwilling to watch its rival parade intercontinental missiles with ranges reaching Los Angeles or New York.

It would have been an awkward day for President Trump, brooding over Beijing’s spectacular display of soldiers moving in immaculate formation, each step perfectly measured, each turn rehearsed into muscle memory, and missiles rolling past the reviewing stand menacingly.

His own “birthday” military parade in Washington, marketed as the grandest military display since World War II, the so-called “Salute to America”, generated more ridicule than awe as it turned into an awkward spectacle of rain-soaked tanks parked on the mall, modest flyovers, and scattered military units that looked somewhat disheveled, disorganized, and unmotivated.

Japan also refused to attend and actively lobbied others to do the same, possibly unwilling to annoy Washington or validate a performance that reminded it of its own wartime history with China.

India’s Narendra Modi boycotted the event, even though he was on Chinese soil for Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meetings. India is a fierce rival of China, and Modi was likely keen to signal his country’s determination not to be cast as a subordinate player in China’s machinations.

Western Europe was largely missing, with only Serbia and Slovakia breaking ranks.

In the Shakespearean drama that is international relations, Beijing demonstrated its ability to convene a performance, but Washington and its partners, and a huge chunk of the world, demonstrated their ability to resist buying tickets.

China’s Gambit

John Mearsheimer has argued that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business. 

Military parades are a risky business. They impress friends but deepen the anxieties of rivals. What inspires awe in Nairobi or Tehran may provoke caution in Delhi, Tokyo, or Brussels, as evidenced by the empty chairs.

America is a real superpower whose advantage lies in what cannot be paraded: tested combat forces, global logistics, and enduring alliances.

NATO, AUKUS, and the Quad are not ad hoc partnerships but treaty networks that bind multiple continents. Combat credibility also belongs to Washington. American forces have fought, lost, and adapted in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, and beyond.

China has not fought a major conflict since 1979.

However, even America could not avoid feeling a pang of anxiety as China strutted its stuff on Victory Day.

China showed it has the discipline, the resources, and the nuclear range to be feared, respected, and perhaps even followed.

Kenya’s Choice

Kenya did not attend, reflecting the long tradition of the Global South in balancing between powers.

Nairobi instead hosted a local symposium with the Chinese Embassy, acknowledging the relationship without granting Beijing the optics of full endorsement.

From the Bandung Conference of 1955 through the rise of the Non-Aligned Movement under leaders like Nehru and Nkrumah, states on the geopolitical periphery have often sought to resist being pulled fully into the orbit of any one great power.

Today, Nairobi applies the same lesson: Washington provides security cooperation and investment. Beijing builds the roads, railways, and digital networks that shape Kenya’s economy. Openly choosing one side would be reckless.

Kenya's pragmatic hedging is therefore not a weakness but wisdom.

Gem Musings is a seasoned International Relations and Public Affairs Strategist with extensive experience in global diplomacy, communication, and policy analysis